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APPELLANTS'REPLY 
1. The grounds upon which the district court granted summary iudgment was not 
an issue raised bv the moving party. 
It is undisputed that the district judge granted summary judgment on the grounds 
that no contract was formed because AHMSI did not return a signed copy of the 
Modification Agreement to the Hafers. That specific issue - whether AHMSI returned a 
signed Modification Agreement to the Hafers, and/or whether AHMSI's failure to return 
the signed agreement precluded contract formation - was not before the court. 
AHMSI argued on summary judgment that there was no enforceable contract 
based on two grounds: (1) the first Modification Agreement AHMSI sent to the Hafers 
was not properly notarized by the Hafers, and; (2) the second Modification Agreement 
AHMSI sent to the Hafers was not returned by the Hafers until after the stated deadline. 
R. p. 79. Nowhere in respondents' motion for summary judgment is there an argument 
that a valid, enforceable agreement to modify the Hafers loan did not exists between the 
Hafers and AHMSI because AHMSI did not return a signed copy of the Modification 
Agreement to the Hafers. Therefore, there is no colorable argument that AHMSI can 
make that the basis, or grounds, upon which the district court granted summary judgment 
- that AHMSI did not return a signed copy of the Modification Agreement - was raised 
by respondents' in their motion for summary judgment. 
It is well established law in Idaho that the party against whom summary judgment 
will be entered must be given adequate advance notice and an opportunity to demonstrate 
why summary judgment should not be entered. Idaho Endowment Fund Inv. Board v. 
Crane, 135 Idaho 667, 671 (2001). Furthermore, on a motion for summary judgment a 
district court may not decide an issue not raised in the moving party's motion for 
summary judgment. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527 (1994). In 
Thomson the Idaho Supreme Court specifically held that a non-moving party is not 
required to respond to issues not raised by the moving paiiy even if the non-moving party 
ultimately has the burden of proof at trial. 
The Hafers did not have an opportunity to respond to, or contest, the issue of 
whether AHMSI returned a signed copy of the Modification Agreement to the Hafers, or 
whether AHMSI had to return a signed copy before the agreement to modify the loan 
would be enforceable. Accordingly, the district court erred in granting summary 
judgment to AHMSI. 
AHMSI' s opposition is nothing more than an untutored attempt at misdirection 
and sleight of hand. AHMSI contends the issue before the district court was "whether an 
enforceable agreement to modify the Hafers' loan existed." OPP Brief p. 7 There are 
myriad of issues, and/or elements, to consider in determining whether an enforceable 
contract exists, including but not limited: capacity, offer, definite terms, acceptance, 
duress, fraud, mistake, impossibility, illusory promise and mutual assent. No matter how 
AHMSI couches the "issue", the undisputed facts are clear: (1) the court granted 
summary judgment on the grounds that AHMSI did not return a signed Modification 
Agreement to the Hafers; (2) respondents did not argue in their motion for summary 
judgment that an enforceable contract did not exist because AHMSI did not return a 
signed Modification Agreement to the Hafers. The basis upon which the district court 
granted summary judgment was not an issue raised in the pleadings. It was therefore 
improper for the district court to grant summary judgment. 
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AHMSI argues that because the court was addressing the general issue of contract 
formation, it had the latitude to rule on the issue of formation based on any grounds, 
rather or not raised in the motion. AHMSI's argument is akin to the argument that if a 
moving party raises the issue of negligence then the court could properly grant summary 
judgment based on any element of negligence whether or not raised in the pleadings. 
Such is clearly not the case. In Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, 126 Idaho 527 (1994) the 
defendant moved for summary judgment on a negligence cause of action based on the 
argument that it did not owe plaintiff a duty. The district court found there were issues of 
fact that precluded summary judgment on the issue of duty, but granted summary 
judgment based on lack of evidence of proximate cause. The Supreme Court overturned 
the grant of summary judgment because the defendant had not raised the issue of 
proximate cause in its motion, stating "if the movant does not challenge an aspect of the 
nonmovant's case in that party's motion, the nonmovant is not required to address it at the 
summary judgment stage of the proceedings." Id. at 531. 
Similarly, in Sales v. Peabody, No 41446, 2014 WL 4656522 (Idaho, Sept. 19, 
2014) this court held that summary judgment cannot be granted on issues not raised in the 
pleadings. In Sales the defendant moved for summary judgment on a negligence claim 
on the grounds that plaintiff could not establish duty or causation. The district court 
granted summary judgment based on the finding that a certain fact contained in the 
pleadings was a superseding cause of the injury. This court stated that of summary 
judgment could not be granted on the "superseding cause" theory because it was not 
raised by the moving party. 
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Similar to the Sales case, the district court in the case at bar latched onto a fact 
that had no apparent relevance to any issue or theory presented in the moving the papers, 
and granted summary judgment on an issue not raised in the moving papers. 
Accordingly, it was improper for the district court to grant summary judgment in this 
case. 
Respondents argue for the first time on appeal that a valid contract to modify the 
loan did not exist between the Hafers and AHMSI because AHMSI did not sign the 
Modification Agreement. Respondents inaccurately state that it is "undisputed" that 
AHMSI did not return a signed Modification Agreement to the Hafers. To the contrary, 
it is neither disputed nor undisputed. It is in fact not an issue at all, because respondents 
did not raise it as an issue in the pleadings. 
Respondents' new argument that AHMSI had to sign and return the modification 
agreement is based on the Court's decision in Intermountain Forest Mgmt., Inc. v. 
Louisiana Pac. Corp., 136 Idaho 233 (2001) ("Intermountain Forest"). It is telling that 
respondents utterly fail to set forth the facts in Intermountain Forest, or how the facts are 
comparable to the case at bar. The obvious reason for the dearth of information in 
respondents' brief is because the decision of Intermountain Forest is distinguishable on 
the facts, and is neither controlling nor informative. 
In Intermountain Forest Gary Briggs, the president of Intermountain Forest 
Management ("IFM") made an offer to Laurie Stone, and employee of Louisiana Pacific 
Corp. ("L-P") with whom IFM had worked on a logging project, to have L-P complete a 
logging project on another tract of land. Stone prepared a contract based on the offer 
made my IFM. Briggs signed the contract on behalf of IFM. In his deposition Briggs 
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admitted he was aware Stone had no authority to bind L-P on the contract, the contract 
was unsinged at the time Briggs signed it, and Stone told Briggs she had to take the 
contract back to L-P for a signature. 
The court held "The undisputed facts in the record reasonably support the district 
judge's conclusion that the presentation of the contract to Briggs for a signature was not 
an offer and Briggs was not justified in assuming his assent would conclude the bargain, 
... " Id at 23 7. 
The facts of Intermountain Forest, are substantially different than the facts of the 
case at bar in many significant aspects. First, the issue of AHMSI' s signature on the 
contract was not raised in the summary judgment motion. Second, the Hafers did not 
make the offer to AHMSI, AHMSI made the offer to the Hafers. Third, based on the 
language of the TPP Mr. Hafer is justified in his understanding that by accepting the 
offer, by making his TPP payments, the loan would be modified. 1 "An offer 'is a 
manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person 
in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it.' 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS" Id. at 237. Finally, it is undisputed that 
Mr. Hafer timely made his TPP payments. R. p. 45. Mr. Hafer then signed, notarized and 
returned the Modification Agreement to the AHMSI. AHMSI's argument that no 
1 The Trial Period Plan specifically provides: 
Congratulations! You are approved to enter into a trial period plan under the Home Affordable 
Modification Program. 
To accept this offer, you must make your first monthly "trial period payment." To qualify for a 
permanent modification, you must make the following trial period payments in a timely manner: 
[April, May and June]. After all trial period payments are timely made and you have submitted all 
the required documents, your mortgage will be permanently modified. R. p. 49 
5 
contract is formed until it returns a signed copy of the modification agreement "turns an 
otherwise straight forward offer into an illusion." Wigod at 884. 
2. AMSJ's signing and returning the lvlodification Agreement is an 
unenforceable condition precedent. 
As set forth in the appellants' opening brief, the requirement that AHMSI sign 
and return a copy of the Modification Agreement to the Hafers is an unenforceable 
condition precedent. AHMSI argues that its duty, if any, to sign the modification 
agreement was premised on Mr. Hafer properly accepting the Modification Agreement 
and returning it to AHMSI by the stated deadline. Contrary to AHMSI's contentions, 
AHMSI's duty to provide Mr. Hafer with a signed modification agreement arose once 
Mr. Hafer made his third timely TPP payment. However, even assuming AHMSI's duty 
to provide a singed modification agreement did not arise until Mr. Hafer properly 
accepted the modification agreement, the summary judgment pleadings clearly establish 
that there are disputed issues of material fact regarding whether Mr. Hafer "properly" 
accepted and returned the Modification Agreement. 
3. The foreclosure sale is void i(there was not default. 
AHMSI offers no opposition to the argument that if the Hafers had an agreement 
with AHMSI then they were not in default and foreclosure sale is void. As set forth in 
appellants' opening brief, material questions of fact exist which preclude summary 
judgment on the issue of contract formation. It is undisputed that the Hafers complied 
with the terms of the TPP. The weight of legal authority and precedent establishes that 
when the borrower complies with the terms of a TPP the lender must present borrower 
with a signed permanent modification agreement. Giving the lender unfettered discretion 
of whether to provide the borrower with a signed modification agreement after the 
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borrower has fulfilled his obligations of the TPP turns an otherwise straight forward 
promise into an illusion. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants respectfully request that his court reverse the District Court's decision 
on respondents' motion for summary judgment. 
Respectfully submitted this lih day of November, 2014. 
TOWNSEND LAW, P.C. 
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